10 Sv/h stack damaged by debris blasted from reactor1 in 311 / Starting to rust already

On 9/20/2013, Fukushima Diary reported 8 damages were found on the stack for reactor1 and 2.

(cf, 8 damages found on the stack for reactor1&2 / 66 m from the ground [URL])

In the press conference of 9/18/2013, Tepco’s spokesman commented there is another damage on the stack.

The damaged part is below the 8 damaged reported, started rusting already.

According to Tepco, a piece of debris was blasted by reactor1 explosion in 311, and it hit the part of the stack.

None of the scale of the damage nor the seismic effect to the stack has been published.


↓ Red circled

10 Sv/h stack damaged by debris blasted from reactor1 in 311 / Starting to rust






You can ignore the truth but the truth won’t ignore you.


Français :

La cheminée à 10 Sv/h avait reçu un débris du réacteur 1 en mars 2011 : C’est déjà rouillé


Le Fukushima Diary a publié le 20 septembre 2013 qu’il y avait 8 impacts sur la cheminée des réacteurs 1 & 2. (cf. 8 points endommagés sur la cheminée des réacteurs 1 & 2, à 66 m du sol)
Au cours de la conférence de presse du 18 septembre 2013, le porte-parole de Tepco a déclaré qu’il y a un autre impact sur la cheminée.
La partie endommagée qui rouille déjà est en-dessous des 8 points d’impact précédemment rapportés.
Selon Tepco, un objet a été projeté contre cet endroit de la cheminée lors de l’explosion du réacteur 1 en mars 2011.
Aucun bilan des dégâts, ni des effets du séisme sur la cheminée n’a été publié.

↓ Cercle rouge

10 Sv/h stack damaged by debris blasted from reactor1 in 311 / Starting to rust


Vous pouvez ignorer la vérité mais la vérité ne vous ignorera pas.

  1. Gamma Radiation photos show the hot spots in the structural metal and vent pipes.

    10 Sv/h is typically the Gamma Cam readout limit.

    The proper interpretation is 10+ Sv/h, or > 10 Sv/h

    Possibly MUCH higher than a typical, mid-scale reading with +/- Error Bars (ERF).

    Could conceivably be off (low) by SEVERAL orders of magnitude.

    The 10 Sv/h is ‘Off the Scale’, ‘Pegged-Out’ ‘Over the Top’

    Extreme caution is in order in the vicinity of such possible (certain) containment failures and understated readouts.

    Unfortunately, TEPCO did not even have a functional, reliable hydrogen vent system. They CERTAINLY did not have a FILTRATION system, installed to reduce radionuclide emissions from their hopelessly defective hydrogen gas ventilation system.


    Bill Duff

  2. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Idaho Operations Office

    The Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number One (SL-1), was a United States Army experimental nuclear power reactor. On January 3, 1961 the reactor was restarted after a shutdown of eleven days. Maintenance procedures commenced, which required the main central control rod to be withdrawn a few inches; at 9:01 p.m. this rod was withdrawn almost to the top of the core, causing SL-1 to go prompt critical. In four milliseconds, the heat generated by the resulting enormous power surge caused water surrounding the core to begin to explosively vaporize. The water vapor caused a pressure wave to strike the top of the reactor vessel. This propelled the control rod and the entire reactor vessel upwards, which killed the operator who had been standing on top of the vessel, leaving him pinned to the ceiling. The other two military personnel, a supervisor and a trainee, were also killed. The victims were Army Specialists John A. Byrnes and Richard L. McKinley and Navy Electrician’s Mate Richard C. Legg.

    On the night of January 4, a team of six volunteers used a plan involving teams of two to recover the body of Byrnes. Radioactive gold 198Au from the man’s brass watch buckle and copper 64Cu from a screw in a cigarette lighter subsequently PROVED that the reactor had indeed gone prompt critical. Up until the recovery of radioisotopes of uranium, fission products, and the radioactive isotopes from the men’s belongings, scientists had doubted that a nuclear excursion had occurred, thinking it inherently safe. These findings ruled out early speculations that a chemical explosion caused the accident.

  3. Two possibilities, with a branch, come to mind:

    1) The Contents of the Vertical Stack are that hot and the Gamma is shining through the ‘stovepipe’. This indicates that nuclear fuel or exposed items such as instrumentation probes, routinely in the neutron flux, are wedged at that point. (Not a good thing)

    2) The Stack Pipe and/or structural materials are themselves now radioactive. This would indicate that FISSION took place at that spot or a neutron beam hit the ‘stovepipe’ and/or bracing. Either of these two would be FAR worse than (1) above. They would indicate that fission took place outside the reactor and containment. The inert nuclear grade steel has been made radioactive by neutrons like the SL-1 prompt criticality indicated in the earlier comment.


    Bill Duff

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About this site

This website updates the latest news about the Fukushima nuclear plant and also archives the past news from 2011. Because it's always updated and added live, articles, categories and the tags are not necessarily fitted in the latest format.
I am the writer of this website. About page remains in 2014. This is because my memory about 311 was clearer than now, 2023, and I think it can have a historical value. Now I'm living in Romania with 3 cats as an independent data scientist.
Actually, nothing has progressed in the plant since 2011. We still don't even know what is going on inside. They must keep cooling the crippled reactors by water, but additionally groundwater keeps flowing into the reactor buildings from the broken parts. This is why highly contaminated water is always produced more than it can circulate. Tepco is planning to officially discharge this water to the Pacific but Tritium is still remaining in it. They dilute this with seawater so that it is legally safe, but scientifically the same amount of radioactive tritium is contained. They say it is safe to discharge, but none of them have drunk it.


September 2013