Contaminated water crisisCover-upsDomestic and global EnvironmentPlant hazard

Tepco to re-interrogate 43 workers about 100 m3 overflow

Following up this article.. Tepco narrowed down the workers to re-interrogate to a few tens / “Asking the expert of investigation” [URL]

 

Tepco is implementing the second interrogation with 43 workers regarding the 100 m3 overflow accident. Tepco announced in the extraordinary meeting of 2/28/2014. (cf, [100m3 overflow] Contaminated water is removed by “hand-digging” of human workers [URL])

 

At the moment of 2/28/2014, they haven’t found anyone who possibly lead the water to the full tank to cause overflow. They decided to interrogate 30 workers again, and picked up new 13 workers to interview with.

None of the details of investigation was announced.

 

http://www.tepco.co.jp/tepconews/library/movie-01j.html

 

 

Downplay it in the beginning, and quietly add more information so nobody notices it. All for not letting the cattle escape. This is their strategy.

_____

Français :

See also

Tepco ré-interroge 43 travailleurs sur le débordement des 100 m³

 

Article lié : Tepco réduit le nombre de travailleurs interrogés à quelques petites dizaines : “On fait appel à des experts enquêteurs”

Tepco procède aux secondes interrogations de 43 travailleurs sur l’accident des 100 m³ qui ont débordé. Tepco l’a annoncé au cours de la conférence extraordinaire du 28 février 2014. (cf. [débordement des 100 m³] Les eaux extrêmement radioactives sont récupérées “à la main” par des travailleurs)
Au 28 février 2014, ils n’ont trouvé personne ayant pu envoyer l’eau dans la citerne pleine qui en a débordé. Ils ont décidé de ré-interroger 30 travailleurs et en ont pris 13 nouveaux à interroger.
Aucun autre détail de l’enquête n’a été communiqué.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/tepconews/library/movie-01j.html

Le minimiser au début et ajouter tranquillement de nouvelles information pour que personne ne le remarque. Tout pour que le troupeau ne s’échappe pas. C’est leur stratégie.

Mochizuki
Mochizuki
The writer of Fukushima Diary.
Related
Previous [100m3 overflow] Contaminated water is removed by “hand-digging” of human workers
Next The tank had water to 98% of capacity / Tepco “Can’t reduce due to the serious shortage of water storage”

12 Comments

  2. YUP! Those poor workers…sounds like a lynch mob from the wild west. Workers should ask for the correct/current engineering documents which outline the valves and settings for the waste storage areas in question. Oh and ask for full body scans to see if they have suffered any damage from their work with TEPCO.

  3. Government Regulatory Failure

    Out of date CAD Drawings at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station should not have been allowed by the Japan Government Regulatory Authority or the IAEA.

    TEPCO,Japan, and the IAES as always, are equally culpable.

    If ANY of themm had done their job; this would not be a problem.

    Sincerely,

    Bill Duff

      1. That would be ISO-9002 Documentation Standard Practice rather than hindsight.

      2. Niall,

        Frankly, you are an incompetent liar, not even close to achieving the status of an incompetent advocate.

        Virtually everything you post is contemptible and seldom rises to the level of laughable.

        Sincerely,

        Bill Duff

    2. From Japan nuclear agency upgrades Fukushima alert level:
      http www bbc co uk/ (news/world-asia-23776345)
      http blog isocertsolutions com/ (qms-quality-management-quality-assurance/blog/bid/340392/Poor-Risk-Management-in-the-Japanese-Nuclear-Power-Plant)

      “About 430 liters (113 gallons) of water spilled over a period of as much as 12 hours after a worker misjudged how much could be held by the tank, which is tilting because of an uneven location, Tepco spokesman Masayuki Ono told reporters. As to whether this is the truth or not is something that should be called into question.”

    3. TEPCO Make-Believe Disaster Response Plans

      In any case, let’s look at this from a risk management perspective. A private panel investigating the nuclear disaster concluded that TEPCO’s systematic negligence contributed to the nuclear disaster and criticized its “make-believe” disaster emergency arrangements. “In assessing TEPCO’s approach to safety it is important to bear in mind its track record of cover-ups and falsification of repair and maintenance records,” said Jeff Kingston, Contemporary Japan. Wiley, 2011. 149-155

      The greatest source of information comes from Jeff Kingston in his paper Mismanaging Risk and the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis:The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus -Mar, 2012 http www japanfocus org/ (-Jeff-Kingston/3724)

      http blog isocertsolutions com/ (qms-quality-management-quality-assurance/blog/bid/340392/Poor-Risk-Management-in-the-Japanese-Nuclear-Power-Plant)

  4. ISO certification requires meticulous records keeping and document control. So this is merely another evidence of the ongoing FRAUDS that define TEPCO.

    In 1996, TEPCO acquired the ISO 9001 Certificate

    http www tepcoegypt com/ 9Certification0 html

  5. The nuclear accident at Fukushima was precipitated by natural disaster, but poor risk management, including a failure to comprehend tectonic risk in the most earthquake prone country in the world, and an institutionalized complacency about risk, were major factors increasing the likelihood of a major accident and fumbling crisis response.

    http blog isocertsolutions com/ (qms-quality-management-quality-assurance/blog/bid/340392/Poor-Risk-Management-in-the-Japanese-Nuclear-Power-Plant)

  6. It is important to learn lessons from the poor risk management in the nuclear industry because Japan will probably continue to rely on nuclear energy for years to come despite the Fukushima debacle.

    Risk: Location of the plant on low ground
    Risk: The nuclear accident at Fukushima was precipitated by natural disaster, but poor risk management, including a failure to comprehend tectonic risk in the most earthquake prone country in the world, and an institutionalized complacency about risk, were major factors increasing the likelihood of a major accident and fumbling crisis response.

    Risk: Historic information existed that such an extreme earthquake and tsumani were possible. The disaster consisted of a magnitude 9 earthquake and a 15-meter tsumani.

    Risk: Tepco had ample warnings from many sources, some even internal, that the plant was not going to survive a natural disaster.

    Risk: Tepco actively chose to lead people into believing that a natural disaster of the proportions was not likely.

    Risk: Tepco did not have a proper handle on how to handle an emergency even though they did have drills.

    Risk: There is a possibility that Tepco did not even have an operations manual, or if they did, it was on a shelf somewhere. It took them 6 months to produce one.

  7. Lots of empty spaces and unfilled blanks

    http www google com/ (url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CE8QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tepco.co.jp%2Fen%2Fcorpinfo%2Fprocure%2Finvited%2Fpdf%2Fd3_Entry-e.doc&ei=TJMYU9DZI6SI2gWNv4GoDA&usg=AFQjCNE75vXZXcnasmGsiqumIUIckaqB3g&sig2=0mOgIsdle01EvhG42pF7RQ&bvm=bv.62577051,d.b2I)

    Concerning the requirement of “set up a structure for responding inquiries within a day in Japanese from TEPCO’s employees, etc. in case of failure or defect, and the structure has a sufficient technical level in order to support TEPCO’s employees etc.” attach documents which explain the content of the technical requirement.

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About this site

This website updates the latest news about the Fukushima nuclear plant and also archives the past news from 2011. Because it's always updated and added live, articles, categories and the tags are not necessarily fitted in the latest format.
I am the writer of this website. About page remains in 2014. This is because my memory about 311 was clearer than now, 2023, and I think it can have a historical value. Now I'm living in Romania with 3 cats as an independent data scientist.
Actually, nothing has progressed in the plant since 2011. We still don't even know what is going on inside. They must keep cooling the crippled reactors by water, but additionally groundwater keeps flowing into the reactor buildings from the broken parts. This is why highly contaminated water is always produced more than it can circulate. Tepco is planning to officially discharge this water to the Pacific but Tritium is still remaining in it. They dilute this with seawater so that it is legally safe, but scientifically the same amount of radioactive tritium is contained. They say it is safe to discharge, but none of them have drunk it.

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